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BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: CRIME
VICTIMS' DILEMMA AFTER Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the New York Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
Michele C. Meske
Abstract: In Simon & Schuster, Inc, v. Members of the New York Crime Victims Board,
the Supreme Court held that a statute, New York's "Son of Sam" law, that allowed crime
victims to reach the proceeds of their victimizers' media reenactments of the criminals'
wrongful acts violated the First Amendment. By invalidating the statute, the Supreme
Court eliminated the only presently available means to prevent criminals from profiting
from their crimes and exploiting their victims. This Comment examines the origins of this
problem and proposes that courts use restitutions common law doctrines to prevent
criminals who sell their stories from profiting at the expense of their victims' suffering.
"By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss
and injury of another."1
David Berkowitz, the notorious "Son of Sam" killer, terrorized
New York City for over a year with random shootings of young
women and their escorts, leaving six people dead and seven wounded.2
In response to the public outrage expressed over reports that David
Berkowitz had been offered large sums of money for the rights to his
story, New York enacted its seminal "Son of Sam" law.3 The law was
designed, in part, to prevent David Berkowitz and others like him
from profiting from their heinous acts.4
1. DIG. 50.17.206 (Pomponius, Various Readings 9).
2. Martha A. Miles, Gunman, Who First Struck in 1976, Killed Six and Wounded Seven,
N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 11, 1977, at D17.
3. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1992). The statute provides:
Every person... contracting with any person... accused or convicted of a crime in this
state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine
article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live
entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such
contract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise... be
owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives. The board shall deposit
such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or the legal
representative of any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by
such accused person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of the crime
and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of the establishment of such
escrow account, brings a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and recovers a
money judgment for damages against such person or his representative.
Id. § 632-a(l).
4. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1991), cert.
granted, judg. vacated, and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
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New York's law states that whenever any person or other legal
entity contracts with a criminal5 to produce any media reenactment
6
of the criminal's crime,7 the contracting party is required to turn over
any money owed to the criminal for such reenactment to the Crime
Victims Board.8 The Board holds the money in an escrow account for
the benefit of the criminal's victims. The victim must win a civil judg-
ment against the criminal in order to have a claim to the funds.9
The New York legislature intended to serve two purposes with the
law. First, the legislature sought to recognize victims' rights to be
compensated and be free from exploitation."0 Second, the legislature
wanted to implement the widely-held belief11 that a person should not
profit by committing a wrong. When criminals sell the stories of their
crimes, they are exploiting their wrongs against their victims for
gain.12 New York's legislature, and forty-three other legislatures that
followed its lead, designed "Son of Sam" laws to prevent such
injustice.13
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the "Son of Sam" law vio-
lated the First Amendment, because the law was a content-based dis-
incentive on speech, not narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling
state interest.14 After the Supreme Court's invalidation of the New
York law, the future of other "anti-profit" laws seems dim. If society
wants to protect crime victims from exploitation when their criminal
5. A criminal covered by the statute is "any person convicted of a crime in this state either by
entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial and any person who has voluntarily and
intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which he has not been prosecuted." N.Y.
EXEc. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982).
6. See supra note 3.
7. Section 632-a does not apply to victimless crimes. See Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d at 548.
8. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(I) (McKinney 1982).
9. Id.
10. "[T]he victim must be more important than the criminal." 1977 NEW YORK
LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 267 (Mem. of Senator Emmanuel R. Gold) quoted in Petromelis, 573
N.E.2d at 548.
11. See Jay Howell, Don't Let Criminals Profit from Misdeeds, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1991,
at 10A; see also, Joel J. Ziegler, Must We Victimize Crime Victims?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1988,
at A31.
12. The highest New York court recently considered the constitutionality of that state's "Son
of Sam" law, and it expressly recognized the fundamental injustice that results when criminals
profit by exploiting the stories of their crimes: "Section 632-a embodies the community's belief
that it is not only wrong for criminals to commit crimes and profit from them but also wrong for
criminals to salt their victims' wounds by profiting from the victimization without recompense to
the victims." Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d at 548.
13. See Respondent Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board's Brief at 13,
Simon & Schuster (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-1059) for a complete list of statutes.
14. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501 (1991).
1002
Vol. 67:1001, 1992
Crime Victims' Dilemma
victimizers reap the profits of media reenactments of their crimes,
another means must be used. The common law doctrine of restitution
may provide those means.
This Comment argues that crime victims should receive the profits
their victimizers earn from media reenactments. Principles of equity
dictate that criminals should not be allowed to exploit their victims,
nor should criminals profit from their crimes. After the Supreme
Court's decision, however, "Son of Sam" laws are not a valid method
to provide this recovery. This Comment asserts, therefore, that courts
should use the common law doctrine of restitution to achieve the goal
of preventing exploitation of victims and to ensure that crime does not
pay.15 This Comment advocates restitution for two reasons. First,
restitutionary principles are especially adapted to reach profits earned
by victimizers. Second, despite the Supreme Court's holding in Simon
& Schuster, restitution is not susceptible to constitutional invalidation.
I. THE "SON OF SAM" DILEMMA AND THE
RESTITUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE
When criminals sell stories about their crimes, they exploit their vic-
tims' fear and pain.16 Media presentations of the crime constitute a
"re-victimization" that crime victims suffer while criminals get rich.
The Court has rendered legislative attempts to remedy this situation
invalid. Crime victims now have two equally unsatisfactory alterna-
tives. They can look to invalid laws for aid, or they can simply submit
to exploitation at their victimizers' hands. If states wish to avoid this
untenable situation, they must develop an alternative to the now
unconstitutional "Son of Sam" laws. One possible alternative is the
doctrine of restitution.
Restitution can prevent victim exploitation and wrongdoer profit
through several remedial doctrines developed specifically to prevent
unjust enrichment. These doctrines include the constructive trust,1 7
tracing, 8 and apportionment.19  Although restitution provides an
alternative method to implement the above goals, the Court's holding
15. Although the objective of restitution is to prevent unjust enrichment, not to compensate
victims, compensation also occurs when restitution is applied to this situation.
16. See ROBERT REIFF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM 3-7 (1979).
17. A constructive trust is a remedial device that courts use to give plaintiffs an equitable
right to defendants' ill-gotten gains. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrrTioN § 160 (1937).
18. Courts use tracing to follow wrongfully taken property and identify it when a wrongdoer
has transformed it or mingled it with other property. See 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTrrUTION §§ 2.14, 2.16 (1978).
19. Courts use apportionment when it is equitable to divide ill-gotten gains between the
plaintiff and defendant based on each party's proportionate contribution. See id. § 2.13 at 166.
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in Simon & Schuster requires that courts consider First Amendment
implications when they use restitution to award the proceeds of
wrongdoers' media presentations to victims.
A. "Son of Sam" Legislation
Many legislatures have recognized the fundamental injustice that
results when criminals profit from their crimes and further exploit
their victims. In order to prevent these unconscionable results, the
federal government and forty-three state legislatures enacted "Son of
Sam" laws.z' The laws are strikingly similar in form and operation.21
The "Son of Sam" laws remedy crime victims' plight in several ways.
First, the system forces the party responsible for the victim's injuries,
the criminal, to bear the burden of compensation. Second, the system
expands the period of limitation in which a victim must commence an
action, because the limitation period begins to run when the crime vic-
tims board establishes the escrow account, rather than when the crimi-
nal commits the crime.22 Finally, the system gives the victim priority
over general creditors.23 The benefits of "Son of Sam" legislation and
the principles behind it were not enough, however, to make the law
constitutional.
B. Invalidation of "'Son of Sam" Legislation: Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board
In Simon & Schuster Inc v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board,24 the publisher of a book co-authored by a low-level
Mafia figure raised a First Amendment challenge to New York's "Son
of Sam" law.2 5 Based on the statute's impact on free speech, the Court
sustained the challenge.2 6 The low-level organized crime figure in the
Federal Witness Protection Program had collaborated on a book in
which he described his crimes.2 7 The Crime Victims Board demanded
the proceeds of the book, and the book's publisher sued the Board on
First Amendment grounds.28 The Supreme Court sustained the pub-
20. See supra note 13.
21. See supra notes 3-9, 13 and accompanying text.
22. See N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a(7) (McKinney 1982).
23. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 549 (N.Y. 1991), cert.
granted, judg. vacated, and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
24. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
25. Id. at 507.
26. Id. at 512.
27. See generally NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGuY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1985).
28. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
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lisher's First Amendment challenge. The Court categorized New
York's "Son of Sam" law as a content-based financial disincentive on
speech, because the statute singled out speech concerning a particular
subject for a financial burden.29 When a statute imposes a financial
burden based on the content of speech, it is presumptively inconsistent
with the First Amendment.3" The Court stated that in order to over-
come the presumption of unconstitutionality, a state must show that
the law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.31
New York's statute failed this two-prong test.
Initially, the Court rejected the compelling interest offered by the
Crime Victims Board, but substituted two interests of its own in place
of the state's.32 The interest offered by the Board was to "ensur[e] that
criminals do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before
their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for
their injuries." 3 The Court rejected this because it could find no com-
pelling justification for the state to distinguish between criminals' pro-
ceeds from storytelling and their assets from other sources, and attach
only the former.3 4 The Court stated, however, that victim compensa-
tion was a compelling state interest.35 It also found that the state had
an "undisputed compelling interest" in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes.36 Therefore, the Court adopted the inter-
est of "compensating victims from the fruits of the crime" as the rele-
vant one for purposes of the narrowly-tailored determination.37
The Court addressed the narrowly-tailored prong by analyzing
whether the "Son of Sam" law advanced the Court's adopted inter-
est.38 The Court held that the interest was not legitimately furthered
by the statute,3 9 because the law was significantly overinclusive. 4° The
Court specifically noted that the statute could reach proceeds from
books by such figures as Saint Augustine and Martin Luther King, Jr.,
who included depictions of past criminal activity in their writings but
did not profit from these crimes at their victims' expense.41 Therefore,
29. Id. at 508.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 509.
32. Id. at 510-11.
33. Id. at 510 (quoting Brief for Resp. at 46).
34. Id. at 510-11.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 510
37. Id. at 511.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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the "Son of Sam" law failed the narrowly-tailored prong of the First
Amendment analysis, and the Court declared the statute
unconstitutional.42
Although the Supreme Court invalidated the New York law, the
purposes behind the statute remain. Legislatures are still concerned
for victims and still desire to prevent criminals from profiting from
their crimes. If these goals are to be effectuated, the judicial system
will have to develop an alternative method of recovery. The doctrine
of restitution, which courts have developed to protect individuals from
wrongdoers who would profit at their victims' expense, may be able to
fill the void left by Simon & Schuster.
C. The Doctrine of Restitution
The doctrine of restitution developed as judges sought to undo spe-
cific injustices that existing law did not address.43 The doctrine con-
sists of substantive and remedial principles of broad practical
application,' designed to provide equity in specific cases. The law is
based on two guiding principles. The first principle is that people
should not profit from their wrongs through unjust enrichment.45 The
second principle is that persons who gain through conscious wrongdo-
ing must disgorge their tainted earnings.4 6 These principles take effect
through a variety of remedies, such as constructive trust,47 tracing,48
and apportionment.49 These principles provide enough elasticity to
cover virtually any means people may use to enrich themselves at the
expense of others.50
L Basis for Recovery
The basis for any claim in restitution is unjust enrichment.51 There
are two elements, therefore, to every restitutionary claim. There must
be an injustice, and the injustice must have resulted in an enrichment
42. Id. at 512.
43. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1278
(1989); see Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760); see generally PALMER, supra note 18,
§§ 1.2-1.3, at 6-16.
44. See Laycock, supra note 43, at 1277.
45. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 1, 3 (1937).
46. See id.
47. See supra note 17; see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 18; see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 19; see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 202 N.W. 742 (Minn. 1925); Norton v. Haggett, 85 A.2d 571
(Vt. 1952).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
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to the defendant at the plaintiff's expense.52 Thus, whenever wrong-
doers profit through their wrongdoing, they are subject to restitution-
ary principles.
People are enriched whenever they gain something of value. Resti-
tution is concerned with the value of the gain defendants receive when
they invade the legally protected interests of their victims, not with the
value of those interests.53 Therefore, restitution does not require that
the gain be equal to the value of the interest invaded, nor that there be
any economic value to the interest at all.54 There need only be a gain
as a result of the invasion of a legally protected interest.55
The "unjust" prong of a restitutionary claim may be satisfied by a
wide array of wrongs. Courts have found unjust enrichment when a
defendant committed the wrongs of conversion, 6 fraud and misrepre-
sentation,57 duress,5" misuse of a fiduciary relationship,59 and mur-
der." Therefore, virtually any "wrong" will provide the "unjust"
element necessary for a successful claim of restitution.
2. Measure of Recovery
The objective of restitution is to identify unjust enrichment and
require wrongdoers to disgorge it.61 In unjust enrichment claims,
therefore, courts measure recovery by the defendants' enrichment
rather than by the plaintiffs' loss.62 The availability of relief measured
by the defendants' gain ensures that victims will be able to recover
whenever wrongdoers are enriched at their victims' expense, regard-
less of the actual value of the victims' violated interests.
In some unjust enrichment cases, the defendant's enrichment con-
sists of profits which the wrongdoer earned through the use of the
52. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmts. a, b, c (1937).
53. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.10, at 133.
54. Id.; cf Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946); Olwell v. Nye &
Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946).
55. PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.10, at 133.
56. See, eg., Pioneer Mining Co. v. Tyberg, 215 F. 501 (9th Cir. 1914).
57. See, eg., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
58. See, ag., Welch v. Beeching, 159 N.W. 486 (Mich. 1916).
59. See, eg., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919).
60. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 (1937); see also Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188
(N.Y. 1889).
61. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
62. Laycock, supra note 43, at 1279.
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thing or interest invaded.63 In these cases, the thing itself is not recov-
erable, because it is either intangible, or the wrongdoer has converted
the thing into money through sale or other use.6" As against an inten-
tional wrongdoer, courts will always require disgorgement of profits
when the profits are the product of such use or invasion.65 Whenever
the trier of fact determines that the defendant's retention of the profits
would be unjust, therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to the
profits.6s
3. Mechanics of Recovery
To effectuate restitution's objective of preventing unjust enrichment,
courts require defendants to disgorge ill-gotten gains. However, actu-
ally identifying and segregating the assets owed to the plaintiff from
defendant's other assets can be difficult. Therefore, courts have
designed several mechanisms to shape the recovery. Those relevant to
solving the "Son of Sam" problem are constructive trust, tracing, and
apportionment. 67
a. Constructive Trust
A principle restitutionary remedy is the constructive trust.68 The
constructive trust is a remedial device that serves the goal of prevent-
ing unjust enrichment by requiring wrongdoers to disgorge their ill-
gotten gains in favor of their victims. 69 Judges developed the doctrine
in early English and American cases as they sought to prevent various
unjust situations. 70 Those situations included detrimental reliance on
promises that were unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and
fiduciaries profiting from misuse of their trust position.71
63. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.12, at 157-66, for a general discussion of the recovery of
profits. Restitution of profits for unintended wrongs is considered too harsh a remedy and will
not commonly be used. Id. § 2.12, at 165.
64. See, eg., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173
P.2d 652 (1946).
65. PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.12, at 165; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151
cmt. e (1937).
66. PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.12, at 165.
67. Courts also use quasi-contract to shape an award of restitution in appropriate cases.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION 87-88 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). A discussion
of the doctrine of quasi-contract is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment.
68. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUION 1-2 (1937).
69. See id. § 160 cmts. a, c.
70. PALMER, supra note 18, § 1.3, at 9-16.
71. Id. § 1.3, at 10-11.
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When a court creates a constructive trust, it gives the plaintiff an
equitable right to whatever enrichment the defendant has obtained as
a result of his wrongdoing. 2 This creates a corresponding duty in the
defendant to hold the property for, or convey it to, the plaintiff.73 In
these aspects, the constructive trust resembles the express trust.74 The
express trust is, however, distinct from the constructive trust. A pri-
mary difference lies in their methods of creation. A settlor creates an
express trust by manifesting an intent to do so.75 A court creates a
constructive trust as a remedial measure to prevent unjust enrichment.
Therefore, the constructive trust is a malleable technique, limited only
by the inventiveness of wrongdoers who find new ways to enrich them-
selves unjustly.76 Thus, courts may use the constructive trust to do
justice in a variety of situations where wrongdoers have profited at
their victims' expense.77
b. Tracing
An important companion to the constructive trust in equity is the
notion of tracing. Courts developed tracing rules in cases where the
defendant had sold or traded the asset taken from the plaintiff, and
had invested the proceeds of the transfer in some other asset or fund.
Tracing allows the plaintiff to follow the thing taken by the wrongdoer
through transformations in its form and to determine the asset's pres-
ent form.78 The court can then place a constructive trust on the pres-
ent form of the asset originally taken from the plaintiff, and require the
defendant to transfer ownership of the traced good to the plaintiff.79
Courts apply tracing most often when the defendant has wrongfully
used the plaintiff's goods to produce a profit, and the wrong was
knowing as opposed to mistaken.Y°
72. See id. § 1.3, at 15.
73. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITION § 160 cmts. a, c (1937).
74. An express trust is created by express words, and requires one party, the trustee, to hold
property for the benefit of another party, the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ l(d), (e), 2(a) (1959).
75. Id. § l(e).
76. Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949).
77. See, eg., Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 71 N.W. 294 (Neb. 1897); Latham, 85 N.E.2d
at 168.
78. See, eg., Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877).
79. PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.14, at 180; see also, Nebraska Nat'l Bank, 71 N.W. at 294;
Fulp v. Fulp, 140 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1965).
80. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.14, at 180-81; see, eg., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980) (per curiam). Restitution of profits earned by an unintentional wrongdoer is unlikely.
See supra note 63.
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Courts also use tracing when defendants have commingled the
plaintiffs' goods with their own.81 In order to protect plaintiffs' inter-
ests, courts invoke two presumptions with respect to commingled
property. Both presumptions impute to the defendant an intent to act
for the plaintiff's benefit.82 Under the first presumption, when a
defendant withdraws money from a commingled fund and dissipates
it, the money left in the fund belongs to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
may recover it.83 The second presumption opposes the first presump-
tion, but reaches the same pro-plaintiff result. Under the second pre-
sumption, when a defendant withdraws money from a commingled
fund and invests it, then dissipates the remaining fund, the asset
purchased with the funds belongs to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff may
recover the asset.84 Thus, under either of the two presumptions, trac-
ing operates to the advantage of the plaintiff, either by presuming that
the wrongdoer withdrew assets from the commingled fund and trans-
formed them into another asset, or by presuming that the wrongdoer
left the plaintiff's property in the fund.
c. Apportionment
In some situations, tracing the plaintiff's goods into profits and
impressing the profits with a constructive trust may result in the plain-
tiff receiving not only the value of the thing taken, but the value of the
defendant's efforts as well. 5 When this result seems to deprive the
defendant of more than is fair, a court may apportion the profits
between the plaintiff and the defendant.8 6 Apportionment is not
appropriate, however, when the court has no rational means of deter-
mining an equitable apportionment. In that case, a court might award
the plaintiff all the profits, depending on the equity of the underlying
situation.8 7 Additionally, courts may divest the defendant of a right to
apportionment, and the plaintiff may be awarded the entire amount of
the profits, if the wrong was particularly egregious.88
81. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.16, at 193-207.
82. Id. § 2.16, at 194, 205.
83. Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879). The presumption is commonly known as the
"Rule of Jessel's Bag." PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.16, at 196.
84. In re Oatway, 2 Ch. 356 (1903).
85. See Laycock, supra note 43, at 1287.
86. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
87. See, eg., Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892).
88. See Laycock, supra note 43, at 1289.
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4. Restitution in Action: Snepp v. United States
The Supreme Court's decision in Snepp v. United States8 9 provides
an example of how a court's use of a restitutionary remedy, construc-
tive trust, can prevent unjust enrichment. In Snepp, the United States
sued a former CIA agent, Frank W. Snepp III, for breach of his agree-
ment not to publish any material about his CIA experiences without
first submitting his writings to the CIA for prepublication review and
approval.90 Snepp wrote and published a book about his experiences
with the CIA in Vietnam without receiving the requisite clearance.91
The CIA sued to enjoin further publication of the book.92 The district
court held that Snepp had breached his agreement, as well as his posi-
tion of trust, with the CIA.93 The court enjoined further breaches of
the confidentiality agreement and imposed a constructive trust on
Snepp's profits from the book.94
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that Snepp had
breached his confidentiality agreement, but reversed the district
court's ruling that Snepp had breached any fiduciary duty he owed to
the government. 95 The court based its holding on its perception that
Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish unclassified material,
and on the United States' admission that Snepp's book contained no
classified information.96 In other words, the court believed Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to protecting classified information,
and he had not failed in this obligation. Therefore, the court held the
constructive trust remedy was improper, and remanded the case for a
jury trial to determine damages for breach of contract only.97
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and rein-
stated the constructive trust over Snepp's book proceeds.98 The Court
reasoned that because Snepp was in a position of trust,99 and because
the government had suffered irreparable damage,"° the restitutionary
remedy was the most equitable and effective.101
89. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 507-08.
91. Id. at 507.
92. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp 176 (E.D. Va. 1978).
93. Id. at 179-80.
94. Id. at 181-82.
95. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 931, 935-36.
97. Id. at 936-38.
98. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 510-11.
100. Id. at 512-13.
101. Id. at 515-16.
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Although the Court did not explicitly state its holding in terms of
preventing unjust enrichment, it is possible to identify the two ele-
ments of a claim for restitution in the facts of Snepp. First, Snepp
gained experience and knowledge from the CIA during his employ-
ment there. He transformed this intangible information into a book
which earned him substantial profits.1 "2 This pecuniary enrichment
was unjust because Snepp deliberately and surreptitiously breached his
confidentiality agreement.1 0 3 Therefore, Snepp was enriched at the
expense of the United States, and the Court required him to disgorge
his book profits by way of a constructive trust in favor of the United
States.
II. SOLVING THE "SON OF SAM" DILEMMA: THE
RESTITUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE
After Simon & Schuster, states may not use "Son of Sam" laws to
prevent victim exploitation nor to divest criminal authors of their
undeserved profits. The Court's holding leaves crime victims with
unconstitutional legislation on the one hand, and exploitation on the
other. States can, nonetheless, fill this void in justice. Using restitu-
tionary principles, courts can prevent criminal authors' unjust enrich-
ment by impressing the criminals' profits with constructive trusts in
favor of their victims. The restitutionary approach provides a basis for
a crime victim's claim, a measure of recovery for the victim, and reme-
dial devices to effect the crime victim's relief. Restitution is particu-
larly useful to those who have been harmed because virtually any
wrong that enriches the wrongdoer in a tangible way, be it tortious,
criminal, or even moral,1" may provide a court with a basis for requir-
ing the wrongdoer to disgorge the unjust enrichment. Additionally,
the restitutionary approach is not susceptible to the First Amendment
challenge that defeated New York's "Son of Sam" law. Therefore,
restitution is a viable solution to the "Son of Sam" dilemma.
In Simon & Schuster, the Court stated as a "fundamental equitable
principle"105 that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit . . . or to
102. At the time the United States filed suit, Snepp had already received about $60,000 in
advances from his publisher. Id. at 508 n.2.
103. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978).
104. See, e.g., Bron v. Weintraub, 199 A.2d 625, 630 (N.J. 1964) (constructive trust imposed
on property on the basis that the property owners had "traffic[ked] in the misfortunes of
others").
105. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
510 (1991) (quoting Children of Bedford v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991), cert.
granted, judg. vacated, and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992)).
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acquire property by his own crime." 106 The use of restitution provides
a means to solve the "Son of Sam" dilemma that arises when criminals
turn a profit by writing books10 7 about their crimes. The restitution-
ary method requires the victim to sue the wrongdoer and base the
action on unjust enrichment.1 "'
A. Basis for the Crime Victim's Claim: Unjust Enrichment
An action to require the criminal author to disgorge book proceeds
could be based on unjust enrichment. As previously mentioned, an
unjust enrichment action requires both an injustice and an enrich-
ment. '0 9 The "Son of Sam" situation supports a restitution action
because the criminal author is unjustly enriched by the book profits at
the victim's expense. The criminal author's profits are enrichment.
The injustice, however, is a conglomeration of two wrongs: (1) the
crime itself, and (2) the media presentation. It is the intersection of
the crime and its subsequent exploitation that makes the enrichment
unjust. Considering the undisputed compelling belief that criminals
should not profit from their crimes, 110 courts should compel criminal
authors to disgorge their profits regardless of the availability of a "Son
of Sam" law.
L Criminal Authors' Book Profits Are Enrichment
Criminal authors are enriched when they gain experience and infor-
mation by committing a crime. Criminal authors then use the experi-
ence and knowledge they gained wrongfully at their victims' expense
and transform it into a book. The profits from these books are the
final form of the criminal authors' enrichment. The profits are enrich-
ment in the most literal sense, because they result in monetary gain.
2. Exploitation of Crime Is Unjust
The "Son of Sam" situation presents a clear instance of a wrongdoer
profiting unjustly. Society condemns criminal behavior and labels it
"wrong." Criminal authors flaunt societal values when they commit
106. Id. (quoting Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889)).
107. For the sake of simplicity, this Comment will refer to all media portrayals of crime as
"books," and all criminals as "criminal authors."
108. Victims may be unwilling to undertake civil actions against criminal authors because the
victims lack the funds necessary for litigation or because they fear the trauma of a trial. States
might overcome this obstacle by providing funds for the restitution action, or by undertaking the
action on the victims' behalf. Cf Marvin E. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of
Personal Violence, 50 MiNN. L. REv. 223, 240-241 (1965).
109. See supra footnotes 51-60 and accompanying text.
110. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510.
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and exploit crimes. Criminal authors gain the information and experi-
ence they need to produce books or other material about real-life
crime by hurting their victims. The crime victims suffer once when a
crime is committed against them, and again when the crime becomes
the subject of a book by the very person responsible for their suffering.
Allowing criminal authors to profit from their crimes at the expense of
their victims is, thus, simply unjust.
Crimes, by definition, are the most abhorrent forms of wrongs; that
is why society has determined that they should be prohibited and pun-
ished. Criminal authors take their wrongs one step further by capital-
izing on them. They profit at the expense of their victims' suffering.
Therefore, courts should award restitution to Victims of criminal
authors to prevent unjust enrichment.
B. Measure of Victims' Recovery: Criminal Authors' Profits
As stated, restitution measures recovery by the defendant's gain. 1
This measure of recovery is significant to victims who sue criminal
authors, because the measure is concerned with the value of the
defendant's gain, not the value of the claimant's invaded interest.' 1 2
Where the harm consists of mental anguish over the exploitation of a
crime and the victim's subsequent suffering, the damages are
extremely difficult to quantify. On the other hand, the criminal
author's proceeds are usually substantial and easily ascertainable. 1 3
Therefore, restitution provides a simple and equitable measure of
relief.
Courts will award profits as a specific measure of recovery when the
wrong was intentional and the profits are the product of a wrongful
taking or other interference with the injured party's legally protected
interest. 1 The criminal author's profits are the direct result of the
intersection of two intentional acts: the crime and the exploitation of
the victimization through the published book. Further, criminal
authors violate their victims' legally protected interest of being free
from victimization of any kind. Hence, the proper measure of relief is
the amount of profit the criminal author receives.
I 11. See supra note 62.
112. See supra note 62.
113. At the time Henry Hill, the criminal-author in Simon & Schuster, first came to the notice
of the New York Crime Victims Board, he had already received $96,250 from Simon & Schuster,
and the publisher was holding $27,958 for payment to him. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
114. PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.12, at 165.
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C. Mechanics of Crime Victims' Recovery
1. Creating a Constructive Trust on Criminal Authors' Profits
Using the restitutionary approach, courts could award criminal
authors' profits to their victims through the creation of constructive
trusts that give victims an equitable right to wrongdoers' gain.1 15
Snepp v. United States illustrates how this remedial device works.
In Snepp, the Court gave the United States a constructive trust on
Frank Snepp's book profits when he enriched himself by breaching his
confidentiality agreement." 6 The criminal author presents much the
same problem as Frank Snepp did when he published a book in breach
of his secrecy agreement. Although the nature of the wrong is differ-
ent, the same unquantifiable harm results, and the enrichment is
equally unjust. Because a constructive trust over the book proceeds
reaches only that which criminal authors receive at the expense of
their victims, nothing is taken from criminals that they have any right
to retain.
2. The Significance of Tracing
Tracing allows the plaintiff to reach whatever asset a court attrib-
utes to the thing the wrongdoer took, be it money or an intangible
interest.1 7 Tracing rules are necessary primarily when courts must
follow the plaintiff's property into a commingled mass and identify
it.11 8 Tracing was necessary, for example, in Snepp because Frank
Snepp's enrichment through breach of his secrecy agreement was not
identifiable in the book he wrote. Criminal authors do not trigger
tracing, because their criminal enrichment is explicitly identified in
their books and need not be followed through any transformations.
Tracing is still significant in this context, however, because its pre-
sumptions are based on pro-plaintiff sentiment which bolsters victims'
claims to book profits.
Tracing is specifically relevant because criminal authors take an
intangible interest from their victims and mingle it with their own
efforts to produce a book. The profits from these books are the prod-
uct of a mingled "bag,"1' 9 and a court may presume that this gain is
115. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
116. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (per curiam).
117. See, eg., id; Cablevision of Breckenridge, Inc. v. Tannhauser, 649 P.2d 1093 (Colo.
1982).
118. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.16, at 193-207.
119. See supra note 83.
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held by criminal authors for the benefit of their victims.1 20 The court
implicitly imputes a motive to the criminal author to use the mingled
"bag" to produce a benefit for the victim.1 21 Tracing, with its pro-
plaintiff motivation, supports the claims of victims to the profits that
criminal authors receive through victimization.
3. Apportioning Profits Between Victims and Criminal Authors
A court can avoid an unjust result by apportioning profits between
the plaintiff and the defendant when it is undesirable to require the
defendant to disgorge the entire gain. 122 This is an appealing feature
of the constructive trust because it allows a court to avoid an all-or-
nothing result. If a court is willing to allow the criminal author to
keep the profits from efforts subsequent to the crime, it may still award
some portion of the book proceeds to the victim according to the
degree to which the victimization contributed to them. 123 The appor-
tionment in each individual case depends on the specific facts.1 24 In
this case, the culpability of the act and the connection between the
wrong and the resulting profits would likely prompt an award of all of
the criminal author's profits. 125
III. ADVANTAGES OF RESTITUTION OVER TORT
RECOVERY
In addition to effectuating the stated goals of the "Son of Sam"
laws, restitution provides benefits to crime victims that are unavailable
under traditional tort theories such as assault and wrongful death.
Restitution provides two important advantages over traditional tort
recovery.1 26 The first advantage is an extended period in which the
120. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. Apportionment is also available to
distribute the profits among more than one claimant. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.18, at
214-17 (discussion of tracing fictions applicable to multiple claims against a single commingled
fund).
123. The burden of proof is relevant to the apportionment between the claimant and the
defendant. Claimants usually must prove that their property went into the commingled "bag."
PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.13, at 167. Once a claimant meets this burden of proof, however, the
defendant may have to "distinguish between his own property and that of the innocent party."
Smith v. Mottley, 150 F. 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1906). Further, a claimant may be entitled to the
entire mass of property accumulated by a wrongdoer if the wrongdoer has made it impossible or
unreasonably burdensome for the claimant to establish what portion of the claimant's funds went
into the mass. See Smith v. Township of Au Gres, 150 F. 257 (6th Cir. 1906).
124. See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919).
125. See PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.12, at 165; Laycock, supra note 43, at 1289.
126. These advantages were also provided by the now invalid "Son of Sam" laws. See supra
notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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victim may seek recovery. The second advantage is a priority in favor
of the victim over the criminal's general creditors.
Restitution extends the period of time available to victims to seek
redress from criminal authors. Crime victims may always sue their
victimizers within the applicable statute of limitations for a personal
injury action and obtain a judgment that may be valid for up to twenty
years.127 Victims have little incentive to do so, however, because the
majority of criminals do not have assets sufficient to satisfy a judg-
ment.1 28 In restitution, victims may wait to sue until after criminal
authors have received profits from their books and there is an asset to
recover.129 Restitution, therefore, provides a significant advantage
over tort recovery to victims who are injured and exploited by crimi-
nal authors.
The second benefit of a restitutionary claim is that it allows victims
to gain priority over criminal authors' general creditors. In the tort
context, assets subject to a civil judgment are also subject to the claims
of creditors. In the restitution context, however, creditors are subject
to a constructive trust unless they are bona fide purchasers of the
property subject to the trust. 3 ° Crime victims who receive a construc-
tive trust will not have to share the profits with any creditors of the
criminal author. Hence, restitution provides crime victims with two
important advantages over traditional tort recovery.'
IV. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF RESTITUTION TO
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Although restitution provides an attractive alternative means of
reaching criminal authors' media proceeds, a claim for disgorgement
of the criminal's profits impacts the free expression rights of the crimi-
nal author. Therefore, restitution is subject to the First Amendment
127. See, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(6) (West Supp. 1992) (twenty years); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-22 (1992) (eight years); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.020(2) (1989) (ten years).
128. See REIxT, supra note 16, at 137; ef LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Propriety of Governmental
Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 446, 451 n.20 (1973).
129. There is sufficient authority for the proposition that plaintiffs may choose to regard
either the time of the original wrongful act or the time of the pecuniary enrichment as the time
when the cause of action arose if the two occurrences did not happen simultaneously. Cf Felder
v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929) (injured party may choose point at which enrichment
occurred for purposes of figuring interest); PALMER, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 63-65 (injured party
may obtain the advantage of a longer limitation period by using quasi-contract rather than tort to
recover unjust enrichment from a tortfeasor).
130. REStATEMENT OF RESTrrrTION § 173 cmts. j, k (1937).
131. Although it is not an advantage over tort recovery, it is important to note that a cause of
action for restitution is not terminated by the death of either party. RESTATEMENT OF
RESTrUTION § 149(2) (1937).
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analysis applied to New York's "Son of Sam" law in Simon &
Schuster.
Most commonly, a governmental entity implicates First Amend-
ment rights when it takes some official action that directly or indi-
rectly burdens free expression. 132 First Amendment scrutiny may also
be triggered even when there is a dispute between two private parties
and the only official involvement is through the court that adjudicates
the dispute.133  Courts will therefore need to address a criminal
author's First Amendment claims even though the method used to
reach book proceeds is restitution, not a "Son of Sam" law.
A. Applicable Tests for Validity
There are three ways in which a state might burden free expression:
by singling out expressive activity for control or penalty (content-
based action);13 ' by impacting expressive activity through controls or
penalties which pursue goals unrelated to expression (content-neutral
action);1 35 or by censoring expression in advance of its dissemination
(prior restraint).13 6 A court's determination that a challenged action is
either content based or content neutral determines what form First
Amendment scrutiny will take.
137
1. Content-based Regulations
The Supreme Court demonstrated the analytical approach for con-
tent-based regulations that burden criminal authors' speech in Simon
& Schuster.1 38 There the Court held that regulations, like the "Son of
132. See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). This comports with the constitutional doctrine which generally requires "state action" to
be involved in order for a plaintiff to have a valid claim. See, ag., Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978).
133. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in
a civil action and that it is common law only .... The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). "Our cases. teach that the application
of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms
constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment." Cohen v. Cowles Media, 111 S. Ct.
2513, 2517 (1991); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
134. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-90 (2d ed. 1988).
135. Id.
136. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648
(1955).
137. TRIBE, supra note 134, at 791-92.
138. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
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Sam" law, that impose a financial burden on speech must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest.
139
2. Content-neutral Regulations
A content-neutral law is defined as one that on its face deals with
conduct having no connection with speech,"4 but in application inci-
dentally burdens free expression. The Supreme Court enunciated the
applicable constitutional test for content-neutral laws in United States
v. O'Brien.' The O'Brien test applies when speech and nonspeech
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, 42 and when the
regulation affecting that conduct only incidentally burdens expres-
sion.' 43 The test has four parts. First, the court asks whether the
action is within the "constitutional power" of the state. Second, the
court asks whether the law furthers an "important or substantial"
state interest. Third, the court considers whether the interest is "unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression." Finally, the court deter-
mines whether the "incidental restriction" on free expression is no
greater than necessary to further that interest.
3. Prior Restraints
A prior restraint occurs when the government censors speech in
advance of publication.'" In Near v. Minnesota,4 ' the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law which provided a procedure for abating
"malicious, scandalous, and defamatory"'" newspapers on the
grounds that the law either suppresses publication altogether, or
causes a publisher to seek clearance from a judge before publishing. 47
After Near, speakers may challenge regulations which either suppress
expression altogether, or prompt speakers to obtain clearance before
speaking. If a court finds that a regulation has this effect, and that the
prior restraint is not justified by any "exceptional" circumstances, 4 '
the court should invalidate the regulation.
139. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 509 (1991).
140. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968).
141. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
142. Id. at 376.
143. Id.
144. Emerson, supra note 136, at 648.
145. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
146. Id. at 702.
147. Id. at 712-13.
148. Id. at 716. The Court stated that a state of war would constitute "exceptional"
circumstances. Id.
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B Validity of Restitution
1. Restitution Is Content Neutral
A law is content neutral when it is intended to serve goals unrelated
to the content of the affected speech.149 Restitution is concerned with
preventing unjust enrichment. There is nothing necessarily expressive
about enriching oneself at the expense of another. Thus, on its face,
restitution is content neutral, because it is not concerned with control-
ling or penalizing expressive activity in general, nor with speech of any
specific content, but only with preventing unjust enrichment.
Restitution, although content neutral, may still burden speech in
some applications. If criminals are aware restitution may require
them to disgorge their book proceeds, they may be disinclined to pro-
duce books at all. This possible burden on expressive conduct is
enough to require that courts' use of restitution satisfy the First
Amendment scrutiny of O'Brien.
2. Restitution Satisfies the O'Brien Test
The first prong in O'Brien requires that the courts' use of restitution
must be within the state's constitutional power. Clearly, a state may
enforce rules of law in its courts. Second, O'Brien requires that the
courts' use of restitution must further a substantial state interest. The
Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster labelled as compelling the interest
promoted when courts require criminal authors to disgorge their prof-
its, ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes. 150 Thus,
restitution, which serves the same ends, furthers a substantial state
interest. Third, the interest must be unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The interest here, preventing unjust enrichment, is
grounded in equity, and there is nothing that necessarily links it to a
criminal's expressive rights. Finally, the burden must be no greater
than necessary to further the state's interests. The state action, how-
ever, does not have to constitute the least-restrictive means.151 Resti-
tution enables courts to require criminal authors to disgorge the profits
they earned by capitalizing on their crimes, and award those profits to
149. "[O]ur definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations [is] those that 'are justified
without regard to the content of the regulated speech.'" City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (citations omitted).
150. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 509-10 (1991).
151. "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest,... the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes
that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
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those criminals' victims. This method is no broader than necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment. Further, apportionment is always possible
in a restitution action to avoid unjust results.152 Therefore, authors
who mention a minor infraction in passing are not liable to have their
book proceeds escrowed as they were under the "Son of Sam"
legislation.
Under each of the prongs of O'Brien, restitution is a constitutionally
valid means of preventing criminal authors' unjust enrichment. Thus,
restitution provides a constitutionally viable means for filling the void
left by Simon & Schuster.
3. Restitution Is Not a Prior Restraint on Expression
Courts' use of restitution to require disgorgement of criminal
authors' profits does not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.
A claim of prior restraint by a criminal author would be inappropriate
in this context. No censorship could be involved in the adjudication of
the unjust enrichment claim; the material has already been published.
The only way the restitutionary remedy could suppress publication is
where the criminal author foresees being required to disgorge the prof-
its and foregoes publication as a result. This presumes that criminal
authors would foresee what is a rather remote possibility, and that
further, they have no motive for publishing other than profit. Each is
a difficult presumption to make. Courts' use of restitution has, at
most, a speculative deterrent effect on the criminal author. Therefore,
restitution does not constitute a prior restraint.
V. CONCLUSION
Society recognizes that a fundamental injustice occurs when
criminals profit from their crimes by exploiting their victims. "Son of
Sam" laws were enacted to prevent these injustices in the specific
instances where criminals profit from media reenactments of their
crimes. In Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court invalidated New
York's "Son of Sam" law, rendering its method of reaching criminal
authors' profits void. To prevent criminals from exploiting their vic-
tims for gain, therefore, the justice system should find another method
of reaching those profits. As shown in Snepp, restitution can provide
that method. Restitution is a malleable remedy aimed at preventing
unjust enrichment. It provides a source of liability, a measure of
recovery, an equitable device for disgorgement of profits, and over-
comes the First Amendment challenge sustained in Simon & Schuster.
152. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, courts should recognize restitution as a method for reach-
ing unjust enrichment where the "Son of Sam" laws failed.
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